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To Kill ornot to Kill: The Eradication ofContagious
Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia in Western Europe
JOHN FISHER*
The use of slaughter or "stamping-out" programmes has been a consistent feature
of public animal health strategies, in Western Europe at least, for some three centuries
to the present date. Originally developed in the early eighteenth century, the concept
survived the explosion of veterinary scientific knowledge and capacity from the late
nineteenth century onwards. Its importance has been maintained to the present day
because stamping out works; killing diseased animals and those in close proximity is an
effective means of preventing the spread of infections and usually a necessary basis for
their eradication in a given region or country. As critically, it has usually proved the most
cost-effective answer to infectious livestock diseases, even those characterized by low
mortality.'
Ifsuchprogrammes arebeingquestionedatthebeginning ofthetwenty-firstcentury,itis
becausetheparameters forevaluating costs andbenefitshave shifted. Livestockhusbandry
is nolongeramatterofpure materialcalculation, aswas demonstrated duringtheepizootic
of foot-and-mouth disease in Great Britain and the Netherlands in 2001. The general
population feels uneasy confronted with the mass slaughter ofanimals and the holocausts
ofcarcasses, especiallywhenthediseaseoffers littlethreattoeitherlivestockorhumanlife.
Further, themassslaughteroflivestockimpingesoneconomicsectors,notablytourism,that
have become more important than farming itself.
Nevertheless, a slaughter programme has neverbeen a matterofblanketapplication; its
use and extent depends on the specific nature of the disease and other circumstances.
Further, there are-and have long been-alternatives to mass slaughter. "Vaccination",
in the sense of the deliberate and scientific attenuation of disease organisms to prevent
infection, may date only from the time of Pasteur. However, as an empirical mode of
attenuation, usually termed "inoculation", it was employed well before Jenner developed
his vaccine against smallpox.2 Effective control strategies involve choices, as is demon-
strated below.
The article presents a broad overview, firstly ofthe evolution ofslaughter programmes
and their key features as these developed in Westem Europe, and secondly of their
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temporary eclipse inthemid-nineteenth century. The mainfocus, however, is ontheirlater
renewal, at a time when germ theory and Pasteurian immunology were transforming
attitudes towards the treatment of infectious diseases, whether of humans or livestock.
The central theme here is the choice ofstrategies employed by the various national veter-
inary services in the eradication ofcontagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia (CBPP).
The veterinary bureaucracies of the time in Europe, some of which were very recent
formations, were conscious of their new capacities, and anxious to demonstrate their
professional value. In the case of CBPP they seemingly had a choice of weapons: they
could eithertry to stamp out the disease or employ the pre-Pasteunan form ofvaccination
known as "tail inoculation" (for its nature, see below, pp. 319-20). The choices made
differedquiteradicallyacrossthemajorstatesandthereasonsforthisareinvestigatedhere.
The Origins of Stamping-Out
The initial stimulus to develop livestock disease control programmes was provided by a
series of major incursions of rinderpest into Western Europe from its homeland in the
Eurasian steppes from at least the seventeenth century onwards. Rinderpest, or "cattle
plague", as its name attests, wasregarded as the livestockequivalent ofbubonic plague. It
was marked by levels ofmortality among cattle even higher than for its human synonym,
and it seems probable that the use of such countermeasures as isolation and quarantine
against rinderpest owed something to public policies against plague.3 The crucial further
step, the slaughter of diseased stock and the slaughter or isolation of those in contact
with them, appears to have evolved quite independently in Italy, Britain and the Austrian
Netherlands.4
Slaughter and/orquarantine aspolicies necessarily involved otherelements ifthey were
to succeed. Above all else, they required a high degree ofcompliance from stockowners.
This could be achieved only by a mixture of punitive regulation and compensation for
slaughteredanimals, preferably thefulllive-weight value ofstocktoowners whofacedthe
loss oftheir livelihood. Further, an effective slaughter programme was logically comple-
mentedby controls overlivestock movement, amounting attimes to the completeprohibi-
tion ofinternal trade, together with quarantine or prohibition of entry at state borders. A
furtherextension ofsuch strategies was totry andgain information oflikely future threats.
The sum of these measures explains why action could be undertaken only by the state.
Compensation was expensive, while slaughter and trade restriction were unlikely to be
popular. Onlythestatehadtheresources tosupport suchprogrammes andthepowertodeal
effectively with offenders.
3R A Dorwart, 'Cattle disease (Rinderpest): te Wageningen, 1962, 62: 1-7; RdeHerdt,Bijdrage tot
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plague in eighteenth-century England', Agric. Hist. Belgisch centrum voor landelijke geschiedenis, 1970,
Rev., 1983, 31: 104-15. p. 17; Lise Wilkinson, Animals and disease: an
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'Cattleplague in the Netherlandsduring theeighteenth Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 147-61.
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Theslaughterprogrammesagainstrinderpestintheeighteenthcenturywereattendedbya
highdegree ofsuccess in mostcases, atribute tothegrowingpowerandcompetence ofthe
European states inundertaking whatEric Jones has called "disastermanagement".5 Their
naturecanalsoberelatedtotheintellectualethosoftheEnlightenment, toanewwillingness
tosearchoutandexperimentwithnovelremediesfortraditionalproblems. Variationsinthis
ethos also help to explain something of the later development of the programmes.
By the eighteenth century, significant differences had already emerged between, on the
one hand, Britain and the Netherlands, and, on the other, the monarchies of the ancien
regime.Theformerstatesweremorecommercialinorientation,lesscentralizedandbureau-
cratic and less prone to interfere in the economy and society. Thus, in Britain, where
slaughter programmes had encountered considerable resistance, governments were rela-
tively loath to interfere with private commerce. Their slaughter programmes were dis-
mantled once successful, to be forgotten for a century.6
The British Isles also had the advantage of relative isolation from the source of the
rinderpestepizooticsintheRussiansteppes.Conversely,Prussialayacrosstheirpathandits
rulers developed andmaintainedthetypeofstrictmeasuresconsistentwithanauthoritarian
tradition. Slaughter programmes were complemented by trade interdicts andthe use ofthe
army to mount a border cordon in response to information of the approach ofrinderpest.
Such measures continued into the late nineteenth century, despite the cordon being both
outflanked and penetrated in the 1850s and 1860s.7
A dirigiste tradition also marked the evolution of livestock disease control in France,
where thefirst use was made ofsome sortofveterinaryexpertise. Theearliestprogrammes
hadbeendeveloped by physicians andenforcedbypolice ormilitary servicesbut, in 1763,
the graduates ofthe newly-founded veterinary school at Lyons were employed to meet an
incursion ofrinderpest. Their success led to official recognition ofveterinary graduates, in
France at least, as the appropriate personnel to mount public defences against rinderpest.8
Theingredients were thus inplaceinthelateeighteenth century fortheconstruction ofa
permanent public service against rinderpest and other infectious livestock diseases. The
French veterinary schools at Lyons and Alfort were the first ofmany such foundations in
WesternEuropean statesbytheendofthecentury(significantly,onlytheBritishschoolwas
privately rather than publicly funded).9 There was no further development, however,
towards a veterinary bureaucracy. Most states did develop a full apparatus of laws and
regulation on procedures to be used against epizootics. Veterinary school graduates did
receive financial support from the state in France and Prussia. But in neither did a
5Eric Jones, The European miracle, Cambridge Rinderpest', J. R. Agric. Soc. England, 1857, 18:
University Press, 1981, pp. 139-49. 197-270, pp. 223-7.
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'British physicians, medical science, and the cattle de 1763,' Rev. Hist. Phar., 1968, 19: 184-6; Robert B
plague, 1865-66', Bull. Hist. Med., winter 1993, 67: Kreiser, '"La Cendrilion des sciences": towards the
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friihere Handelswege', Deutsche Tierarztliche Mathijsen (ed.), The origins ofveterinary schools in
Wochenschrift, 1986, 93: 150-4; W Schonherr, Europe: a comparative view, Utrecht,Veterinair
'History of veterinary public health in Europe in the Historisch Genootschap, 1997, pp. 14-15.
19th century', Revue scientifique et technique. Office 9John Fisher, 'The European Enlightenment,
international des e'pizooties, 1991, 10: 985-94, pp. political economy and the origins of the veterinary
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centralized system develop to meet the problem of epizootics before the mid-nineteenth
century. In France, local veterinarians eked out aprecarious existence with little money or
authority.10InPrussia,districtveterinarians werealsopoorly paidandnotevenresponsible
for the implementation of regulations against rinderpest until well into the nineteenth
century.1'
A variety ofreasons can be advanced for this hiatus. The French Wars were one early
factor. Wars made for the dissemination of livestock diseases while inhibiting counter-
measures. Thereafter, in the first halfofthe nineteenth century, there was something ofan
intellectual reactionagainsttheoriesofdiseasecausationbasedoncontagionorinfection,12
although, with someexceptions,13 this was more muted in veterinary circles than medical.
Certainly, measures basedonthepremise thatrinderpest wascontagious remainedin force
on theborders ofthe mostvulnerable states. As notedabove, Prussiamaintained amilitary
cordon, while the Austrian Empire kept its strict border controls against rinderpest when
those against bubonic plague were allowed to fall into disuse.14
ThePrussianandAustriancordonsmayhaveprovidedadegreeofprotectiontocountries
totheirwest. Certainly, duringtheforty years aftertheendoftheFrenchWars the threatof
rinderpest receded to the point ofbeing almost forgotten in Britain and the Netherlands.
In its absence, the main threat of stock losses came from two other infectious livestock
diseases, CBPP and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). And neither veterinary expertise nor
slaughter policies could control or contain these diseases where enzootically established.
Given the extreme infectivity ofFMD, its associated low mortality, and a high level of
doubtoverwhetheritwasactuallyinfectious, itisnotsurprisingthatlittleeffortwasmadeto
control its incidence. Veterinarians offered cures but these did little beyond bringing the
incipientprofession intodisrepute.15 CBPPwasthe more serious threat; it was attendedby
death rates second only to rinderpest. However, although most veterinarians considered
CBPPcontagious, theyhadnoremedy toofferstockowners. Onefactorwasthattheyknew
little about this or any other disease ofcattle. Veterinary research and training in the new
colleges had their focus overwhelmingly on the horse in the first half of the nineteenth
century.16ThedistinctpathologyofCBPPhadbeendescribedintheeighteenthcentury,but
features ofits aetiology remained controversial muchlater. Even moreimportantly, as will
be seen below, although it was stamped out in some regions, certain characteristics ofthe
disease made it more difficult to deal with than rinderpest.
10George Fleming, Animalplagues: their history, 13See, for example, William Dick, 'On the non-
nature, andprevention, vol. II: Chronological history contagious nature ofepizootic diseases', Trans.
ofanimalplaguesfrom A.D. 1800-1844, London, Highland agric. Soc., 1859, 22: 265-81.
Bailliere,Tindall andCox, 1882,pp.39-46; CarolineC 14G E Rothenberg, 'The Austrian sanitary cordon
Hannaway, 'Veterinary medicine and rural health care and the control ofthe bubonic plague, 1710-1871',
in pre-revolutionary France', Bull. Hist. Med., 1977, J. Hist. Med. Allied Sci., Jan. 1973, 28: 15-23, p. 22.
51: 431-47. '5J R Fisher, 'Animal health and the Royal
ll J A W Dollar, 'Notes on the Berlin Veterinary Agricultural Societyinitsearlyyears',J.R.Agric. Soc.
School', Veterinary Record, 1892, 4: 349-50; R England, 1982, 143: 105-10.
Froehner, 'Zur Entwicklung des Veterinarwesens in 16Kreiser, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 15-16;
Preussen', Tierarzl Mitteil, 1929, 10: 439; Schonherr, M F Brumme, 'The emergence of veterinary
op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 988-91. instruction in the German language area: apreliminary
12E Ackerknecht, 'Anticontagionism between typological study', in Mathijsen (ed.), op. cit., note 8
1821 and 1867', Bull. Hist. Med., 1948, 22: 562-93. above, pp. 31-7.
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Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia
TheoriginsofCBPPareobscure. ReferencestoanorigininSwitzerlandintheeighteenth
century17 onlyreflectitsearliest identification there as aseparatedisease-asdistinctfrom
"murrains" ingeneral.18Acontagious,febrilediseaseofcattleandgoats,CBPPisachronic
affection caused by Mycoplasma mycoides subspecies mycoides. Like rinderpest, it is
normally spread by animal to animal contact but, unlike rinderpest, it has a relatively
long incubation period ofnormally three to six weeks, but can be much shorter or longer.
Further, cattle can have the disease and be contagious well before they exhibit overt
symptoms, recoveredanimalsremaincontagiousand,althoughinfectionisnormallyspread
through close contact, droplets from the respiratory tract can travel over some distance.'9
Suchcharacteristics make CBPP difficult to deal with; itmade anumberofincursions into
southern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, and was hard to eradicate.20
The characteristics also made for marked regional disparities in incidence. The early
dissemination ofCBPPhas been linked to the FrenchWars21 but itscontinuing spread was
due tothetrade that supportedthegrowth in specialisation ofcattleenterprises. Intheearly
nineteenth century, andwhateveritsorigin, thediseasebecame associatedwiththegeneral
movementofcattlefromeasttowest, fromrelatively lowpriceregionspractisingextensive
pastoralism to the relatively high price regions where specialization in cattle rearing and
cattleproductswasgreater.Withinthewest,itsincidencewashighestwhereproductionwas
most intense, as in dairying and fattening. Town dairies and centres where cattle were
fattened on the cheap waste from food processing became especially notorious for CBPP.
Alternatively, regions where farmers bred their own stock and sold theirproduce or cattle
outremainedlargelyfreeofthedisease. Thedifferences hadmajorimplications fordisease
control, as can be demonstrated from the experience of the Netherlands, among other
regions, in the early nineteenth century.
The early commercialization of the Dutch economy led to specialist dairying by
the sixteenth century, although substantial exports only began in the nineteenth.22 The
Netherlands was also an early international market centre for cattle, and suffered parti-
cularly badly from the three waves ofrinderpest in the eighteenth century. The scene for
17DESalmon, 'Someexamplesofthedevelopment
ofknowledgeconcerninganimaldiseases',Yearbookof
the United States Department ofAgriculture, 1899,
Washington, Government Printer,1900, p. 109;
B H Slicher van Bath, The agrarian history ofwestern
Europe 500-1850, transl. 0 Ordish, London, Edward
Arnold, 1963, p. 296.
'8George Fleming, Animalplagues: their history,
nature, andprevention, vol. I: Chronologicalhistoryof
animalplaguesfrom B.C. 1490 toA.D. 1800, London,
Chapman and Hall, 1871, p. 198.
19J R Hudson, 'Contagious bovine pleuropneu-
monia', FAO Agricultural Studies, No. 86, Rome,
1970. See also E A ter Laak, 'Contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia', Vet. Q., 1992, 14: 104-10, and
J Blancou, 'Early methods for the surveillance and
control for bovine pleuro-pneumonia', Revue
scientifique et technique. Office international des
e'pizooties, 1996, 15: 1263-7.
20R A J Nicholas et al., 'A comparison of serolo-
gical tests and gross lung pathology for detecting
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia in two groups
of Italian cattle', Vet. Rec., July 1996, 139: 89-93;
A Linden and D Desmecht, 'La pleuropneumonie
contagieuse bovine: historique, agent
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Vlaams Diergeneeskundig Tijdschrift, 2000, 69:
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21 Fleming, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 531;
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extensive experiments with inoculation,23 this failed to prevent the loss of thousands of
animals. Only after a slaughterpolicy was adopted in a 1799 Act, backedby compensation
payments from aCattle Fundleviedon stockowners, was thediseaseeffectively contained,
with a further outbreak around Utrecht in 1813 also quickly eradicated.24 The Fund
yielded sufficient revenue to underwrite the foundation of a veterinary school in Utrecht
in 1821,thelastofthemajorEuropeanfoundations.25Howeverneitheritsgraduates northe
slaughterpolicyprovedofgreatvalueagainstCBPPafteritsinitialincursionfromGermany
in 1833.
Its introduction was inevitable with the revival ofthe European cattle trade after the end
ofthe French Wars, with an estimated 40,000 cattle moving annually across its borders by
the 1830s.26 Anextensive internal tradeledtoitsrapiddissemination. Althoughthere were
fewurbandairiesintheNetherlands,duetotheexcellentwatertransportsystem,27therewas
an active trade in store cattle and the unwanted calves that were by-products ofintensive
milking. CBPP quickly became enzootically established and the Cattle Fund was bank-
rupted in 1849 by claims for compensation. By mid-century the Netherlands had become
"the hot-bed ofpleuro-pneumonia",28 in the later words ofa German veterinarian. It was
the source of infection for the British Isles, North America and South Africa.29
Incidence of the disease was nevertheless highly variable. It was worst where cattle
density and turnover were highest, as in what was known as the "Spoelingdistrict" near
Rotterdam in the province of South Holland, a centre for distilling where cattle were
fattened in large numbers on the waste. It was also prevalent in the dairy sector, as in
FrieslandandGroningen,30buttherewerefewcases inbreeding andrearing regions. Inthe
province ofZealand, forexample, a local veterinarian succeeded in stamping outCBPP in
1839. Strict controls maintained the province's disease-free status afterwards.3'
The same pattern held throughout Western Europe. CBPP became enzootic in urban
dairies andfattening centres. This wasnotablythe case atMagdeburg in Saxony, themajor
Germancentreforthesugarbeetindustry.Besidesthecattlefedoffthewasteproducts,large
numbers were required for haulage. Conversely, the Scandinavian countries, where cattle
movements were overwhelmingly outwards, remained free from the disease. In Sweden
(then including Norway), the few isolated outbreaks due to imported cattle were quickly
23CHuygelen, 'Theimmunization ofcattleagainst
rinderpest in eighteenth-century Europe', Med. Hist.,
1997, 41: 182-96.
24COffringa, VanGildestein naarUithof: 150jaar
diergeneeskundig onderwijs in Utrecht,
Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1971, pp. 23, 34.
25p A Koolmees and A H H M Mathijsen, 'The
developmentofveterinarymedicineintheNetherlands.
A chronological orientation since 1700',Argos, 1993,
8: 227-8.
26George Annatage, 'On pleuro-pneumonia',
Trans. Highland agric. Soc. Scotland, Feb. 1870, 4th
series, 2: 46-81, p. 76.
27Charles Whitlaw, On the management ofdairies
in Holland: on the management ofdairies as now
conducted in London: to the Right Hon SirJohn
Sinclair, Bart. &c. &c., original edition 1830[?], New
Haven, Conn., Goldsmith-Kress Library no.26164,
microfilm, 1980.
28Karl Muller, Professor ofAnatomy at the
Berlin Veterinary College, in evidence to the
Select Committee ofthe House of Commons on the
Cattle Plague and the Importation ofLivestock
(British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1877, IX),
Q.1444.
29J R Fisher, 'A panzootic ofpleuro-pneumonia
1840-1860', Historia Medicinae Veterinariae, 1986,
11: 26-32.
30A Hoek, Geneeswijze der longziekte bij
rundvee, 's-Gravenhage, 1852; [A Duparc], Verslag
van het heerschen der besmettelijke longziekte
onder het rundvee in die Provincie Friesland,
gedurende 1862, Leeuwarden, Suringar, 1862;
JdeVries, 'Veeartsen in Friesland 1800-1850',Argos,
1994, 11: 9-25.
31 Offringa, op. cit., note 24 above, pp. 67-8.
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stamped out.32 Even Denmark remained free, although CBPP was enzootic in the border
province ofHolstein. Rigorous border controls and the rapid slaughter ofany imports that
later proved to have the disease maintained its status.33 The validity of the stamping out
model was thus still apparent, but this was oflittle value in most ofWestern Europe. The
scale ofcattle movements made control impossible, the disease became enzootic and was
regarded as an occupational hazard by most stockowners by the 1840s.
Tail Inoculation
The costs ofCBPP were heavy. Although not all cattle were infected, death rates were
high-some 30 per cent of herds, it was estimated, even when the disease had become
enzootic. Another 30 per cent suffered a severe depreciation in value (although the meat
couldsafelybeeaten).34ItwasthemostseriousproblemfacingEuropeancattleproducersin
an otherwise favourable market.35 There was thus every incentive to develop a "magic
bullet" (to anticipate Paul Ehrlich's famous concept),36 with inoculation, which had been
successful against sheep-pox as well as smallpox,37 the favouredpossible remedy. Various
French and German experiments failed38 before a Belgian physician, Louis Willems,
developed a successful method. His father had incurred serious losses to CBPP while
fattening cattle off distillery wastes at Hasselt, and the son made an intensive study of
the disease while experimenting with inoculation in the 1840s.
Willems' innovation was to transmit the disease agent by an unnatural route that
attenuated its impact. In the course of experimentation, he used the serous fluid from
the lungs ofanimals slaughtered afterbeing infectedby CBPP, and inoculated the material
into the tails of healthy cattle. By 1852, he was satisfied that this gave immunity to the
disease, andhepublishedhisresults inhisMemoiresurlapleuropneumonia e'pizootiquedu
bitail.39 Given the importance of the topic, his claims naturally received international
attention. All the major Western European governments, except that of Britain where
the Royal Agricultural Society took this role,40 instructed their leading veterinarians to
test the Willems' method.
32ESchoeg, 'Elakartad lungsjuka, dessf6rekomsti
Sverige pi 1840-, 50- och 60-talen', Svensk
veterinartidskrift, 1901, 6: 161-76.
33Simonds, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 214-17;
CountCFDanneskiold-Samsoe, evidencetotheSelect
Committee on the Cattle Plague,1877, see note 28
above, Qs. 391-3.
34ESemmer, 'Lungenseuche', in Alois Koch (ed.),
Encyclopddie der gesammten Thierheilkunde, Vienna,
Moritz, 1889, 6: 174-89.
35Blancou, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 1280;
J Gamgee, 'Statistics of loss amongst live stock in the
United Kingdom', Edin. Vet. Rev., Aug. 1863, 5:
476-81.
36See, for example, Allan Chase, Magic shots: a
human and scientific account ofthe long and conti-
nuing struggle to eradicate infectious diseases by
vaccination, NewYork,WilliamMorrow, 1982,p. 159.
37C Huygelen, 'The early years of vaccinology:
prophylactic immunization in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries', Sartoniana, 1997, 10:
79-110.
38Angela von den Driesch, Geschichte der
Tiermedizin, Munich, Callwey, 1989, p. 184; William
Youatt, 'On epizootic diseases', Veterinarian, 1842,
15: 165-9, 241-51, 343-7 and 399-409, p. 347.
39Louis Willems, Me'moire sur lapleuropneumo-
niae.pizootique du be'tail, Bruxelles, Th Lesigne, 1852.
This was published simultaneously in Flemish:
Verhandeling over de longziekte van het vee, en de
middelen omhetzelve ertegen tebehoeden,Ghent,Van
F en E Gyselynck. For details on Willems, see C
Huygelen, 'Louis Willems (1822-1907) and the
immunization against contagious bovine pleuropneu-
monia: an evaluation', Verhandelingen van de
Koninklijke Academie voor Geneeskunde van Belgie,
1997, 59: 237-9, 249-52.
40AtthesuggestionofPrinceAlbert(thenephewof
the Belgian king); see Farmers' Magazine, Feb. 1853,
3rd series, 3: 76.
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The results were mixed. The report from Belgium was highly critical, while those from
France, the Netherlands and Prussia were cautiously favourable.41 The British response,
after high initial interest,42 proved the most unfavourable. J B Simonds, a professor at the
RoyalVeterinaryCollege,foundWillemsoverlydogmaticandthetwoquarrelledovertheir
observations of the outcomes of various trials. Simonds' distaste for Willems' technique
was made evident: "surgical and scientific techniques certainly did not rule in these
operations",43 while his later attempts to replicate Willems' technique proved unsuccess-
ful.44 As Simonds was virtually the only Britishauthority oncattle diseases, his opposition
to tail inoculation had lasting consequences.
The variable outcomes and verdicts reflected the contemporary limitations ofscientific
method as much as those ofWillems' technique. It was generally agreed that some immu-
nitywasconferredbytailinoculationbuthowmuch(orforhowlong)wasseriouslyatissue.
The degree of success depended on how the test was conducted and how the operation
was performed, as well as on the source, the virulence and the age of the "pleural" or
"pulmonary exudate" (fluid eitherfrom thepleural cavity orencystments in the lungs ofa
diseased animal) used. There were so many variables that could easily go wrong that the
caution of official veterinarians was understandable.
Inoculation also led to many animals losing their tails and to the inadvertent transfer of
otherdiseases.Nevertheless, andalthoughitwasnotanidealmagicbullet,itbecamewidely
adopted, especially in the Netherlands.4s Its great advantage forthe individual stockowner
was itscost-effectiveness. Itgave anappreciable extension totheproductivelifeofcowsin
urbandairies, and adegreeofsecurity tofattenersbuying store stock. Itwas alsoextremely
popular with private veterinarians. Although the basic technique was simple enough to be
employed by stockmen (as it was extensively in Australia46), professional veterinarians
were the chiefinoculators throughout Europe, providing a major boost to their status and
incomes. It was even widely employed in English urban dairies,47 despite Simonds' dis-
approval. Further, Willems and continental veterinarians continued to experiment with
inoculation, improving its reliability appreciably over the next twenty or thirty years. It
was then, from the 1870s, that it became seriously considered as an option to be used to
eradicate CBPP.
Towards Containment and Eradication
Thethirty years to 1860 sawCBPPestablishedonallmajorlandmasses apartfromSouth
America. After anotherthirty years, it was ingeneral retreatexceptperhaps inAfricanorth
41Huygelen, op. cit., note 39 above, pp. 261-8. (1755-1810), Zwolle, 1992, pp. 109-55; J de Vries,
42Farmer'sMagazine,March 1853,3: 221-5;Nov. 'Veeartsen in Friesland 1850-1900', Argos, 1995, 13:
1853, 4: 415-17. 87-93.
43J B Simonds, 'Report on inoculation for pleuro- 46John Fisher, 'Pastoral development and the
pneumonia in cattle', J. R. Agric. Soc. England, veterinary profession in Australia, 1850-1900',
1852, 13: 373-85, p. 379. Aust. Vet. J., 1995, 72: 126-31.
441dem, 'Report on the prevention ofpleuro- 47Armatage, op. cit., note 26 above, pp. 60-2;
pneumonia in cattle by inoculation', J. R. Agric. Soc. evidence ofHenry Woodruff in Report ofthe
England, 1853, 14: 244-73. Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into
45J W Buisman, Tussen vroomheid en Verlichting. pleuro-pneumonia and Tuberculosis in the United
Eencultuurhistorischen-sociologischonderzoeknaar Kingdom. Part I (BPP, 1888, XXXI [C.5461]), Qs.
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ofthe Zambesi andCentral Asia. The means thatenabledthis transformation arose outofa
number of developments, notably the growth in knowledge of CBPP aetiology and the
continually improving mode of tail inoculation. The impetus towards eradication in
Western Europe, however, came from other developments.
The first of these was a resurgence of rinderpest in Western Europe in the 1850s and
1860s. The validity of slaughter policies was again fully demonstrated in its containment
and eradication and, unlike in the previous century, the institutional means employed to
meet the threat were now maintained and even augmented. Agricultural ministries in each
stateacquiredaneworanincreasedveterinarycapacity. Neworganizationswerefoundedin
the Netherlands and Britain,48 and, in each, public veterinarians were given a new level of
authority in initiating and implementing disease control strategies. With rinderpest sub-
siding as a threat in the 1870s (except in Germany), they could turn theirattention to other
diseases, withcontrol ofCBPPnaturally amajorobjective. Beyondthe directlossesdue to
thedisease, anaddedincentiveforseveral countrieswastherapidgrowthofthetradeinlive
cattle, and especially the export of store and fatstock to Britain.49
There were still major difficulties to be faced. By the 1860s, veterinarians had become
well aware of CBPP's variable and potentially lengthy incubation period. The first two
International Veterinary Congresses, heldinHamburg in 1863 and inVienna in 1865, saw
leading authorities debate the implications for public policy. There was considerable dis-
agreement on the usefulness ofrestrictions on cattle movement and trade, and on whether
slaughter or inoculation provided the most viable approach to control.50 This was imme-
diately before Pasteur's work on germ theory and innovations in immunology helped to
validate both approaches, so the debate over their rival merits continued to the end of
the century without being resolved. In fact, progress towards eradicating CBPP in the
various countries took on something of the nature of a contest between stamping out
and inoculation.
The contrasting approaches can be related to Michael Worboys' arguments on the
intellectual ethosthathasdominatedofficial veterinarythinking inBritainfromthisperiod
onwards. Heportraystheleaders intheBritishVeterinaryDepartmentinthelatenineteenth
centuryasadvancing "adistinctlyveterinaryconstructionofepizooticdisease ...expressed
in what was termed the 'importation theory of disease' . . . The theory was directly asso-
ciatedwith 'keepingout',orifandwhenthatfailed, 'stampingout'.,,5l Histhemeprovidesa
valuable insight into veterinary thinking over time, particularly the attitude of leading
British veterinarians towards germ theories, but it is also somewhat misleading in
the present context. Most significantly, if British veterinarians were wedded to "killing
48C j Q Kerstens, 'How it evolved', in Veterinary International Veterinary Congress', Vienna 18 July
Work in the Netherlands, The Hague, Ministry of 1865, in idem, The cattleplague, London,
Agriculture and Fisheries Veterinary Service, 1971, R Hardwicke, 1866, pp. 488-99, 781-7.
pp. 12-25; S Hall, 'The stimulus for statutory control 51 Michael Worboys, '"Killing and curing":
of animal diseases in Great Britain in the nineteenth veterinarians, medicine and germs in Britain, 1860-
century', Vet. Rec., 1975-76, N.S., 6: 3-12. 1900', Vet. Hist., 1992, 7: 53-71, p. 57; see also his
49R Perren, The meat trade in Britain 1840-1914, 'Germ theories ofdisease and British veterinary
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 111-12. medicine, 1860-1890', Med. Hist., 1991, 35: 308-27;
50John Gamgee, 'Official report of the and Spreading germs: diseases, theories, and medical
International Veterinary Congress, Hamburg 14-18 practice inBritain, 1865-1900, Cambridge University
July 1863', and 'Official report of the Second Press, 2000, ch. 2.
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not curing" on the grounds of cost-effectiveness, then their approach was firmly in the
European mainstream.
In fact, there were a number of ironies to the policy choices made and the objec-
tives attained in different countries. The eradication of CBPP was first achieved in the
Netherlands, theninBritain, theoriginal sources ofglobaldissemination. Thechiefweapon
employedinbothcountries was stamping out, backedbyrigorous quarantine, inadramatic
reversal oftheirpreviousreluctance to interfere withfreedomofcommerce. Conversely, in
themoredirigiste states ofFranceandPrussia, whereCBPPremainedenzootic attheendof
the century, traditional approaches based on stamping out and quarantine were modified
substantially in attempting to contain the disease. As will be seen below, the contrasts
provide a nice example ofthe primacy ofeconomic considerations over cultural tradition.
Thiswasbecausecircumstancesdifferedradicallybetweencountries.Thus,Britain, asan
island, was in the enviable position of being able to prevent CBPP incursions at a much
lowercostthananyothercountry. Second, policywasnevertheresultofcoherent, thought-
outplanningputintopractice. Rather, itevolvedovertime in response to forces such as the
relativepoliticalpowerofvariousinterestedgroups,whichcouldbeatoddswitheachother.
Policy formulation was alsomarkedbyconsiderable interdependence, inpartreflectingthe
nature of the European cattle trade and the manner in which policy in one country had
implications foranother. Finally, policy makers learntfromexperience, eithertheirown or
that of others. These themes are explored below.
Britain
Severalhundredthousandlivecattle wereimportedannually intoBritain inthe courseof
the 1860s. In 1865, this resulted in the introduction of rinderpest and the subsequent
epizootic, the "cattleplague", transformed attitudes towards infectious livestockdiseases.
Inparticular, itledfarmers toestablishtheCentral andAssociatedChambers ofAgriculture
in 1866, in large part to lobby for government measures against disease.52 The Chambers
movementincreasinglysoughttheprohibitionoflivestockimports;thethreatofdiseasewas
the prime overtconcern, butbreeders, especially, could see the advantages ofsuch restric-
tions. Over the next three decades, despite the prevailing intellectual orthodoxy on free
trade, farmers won a series ofmeasures restricting live imports, amajor success being the
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Actof 1878.53 Oneprovision ofthe Actwasthatlivecattle
had to be slaughtered at the port ofentry ifthey came from any country where CBPP was
known to exist. This then included all ofEurope north ofthe Pyrenees and, from 1883, the
United States.
It might have been expected that the Veterinary Department ofthe Privy Council, also
founded in response to the cattle plague, would have enthusiastically espoused measures
thatgaveitgreaterpowerandrelevance at arelatively low cost. However, this was not so at
first. J B Simonds, although converted to germ theory by the 1870s, was sceptical of
the thesis that the necessary precondition for CBPP control was to restrict its importation.
52A H H Matthews, Fifty years ofagricultural 53John Fisher, 'The economic effects of cattle
politics: being the history ofthe Central Chamber of disease in Britain and its containment,
Agriculture, 1865-1915, London, P S King, 1915, 1850-1900', Agric. Hist., 1980, 54: 278-94,
pp. 392-4. pp. 285-6.
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He also exaggerated the infectiousness of CBPP, arguing that controls on imports were
pointless as the disease was so firmly entrenched in Britain that only the most stringent
internal measures could reduce its incidence.54 As the first state Veterinary Adviser, as
editoroftheVeterinarian forthreedecadesto 1881, andasPrincipal oftheRoyal Veterinary
College in the 1870s,55 Simonds had considerable influence. His views were also much to
the taste of Liberal free traders who viewed state interference with imports with great
suspicion.
Simonds' protege and successor in the Department, G T Brown, echoed his views in the
1870s. Nevertheless, his term in office saw the prohibition on live imports policed with
increasing effectiveness. A shrewd political bureaucrat, Brown moved towards an alliance
with the Chambers over time, especially as the political opposition to import controls
subsided with the growth of the chilled and frozen meat trade.56 Rather than portraying
the prohibition of live imports as an alternative to stringent domestic measures, Brown
offered them as complements in a programme that could eradicate CBPP.
The 1878 Act had provided for the slaughter of cattle diseased with CBPP, but left
implementation in the hands of local authorities. They also bore the cost, and were the
more reluctant to enforce slaughter where the incidence ofCBPP was high and the cost thus
greatest.57 Brown sought central government funding and greater departmental powers in
the implementation ofcontrols. With the growth ofthe railway system allowing increased
supplies ofcountry milk into the towns, an attraction for the Chambers, representing rural
stockowners, was thatthechiefburden ofinternal measures wouldfall on theircompetitors,
the urban dairies that were notorious centres of infection.
The alliance stood Brown in good stead when he faced a further challenge to his pro-
gramme in the 1880s. Inoculation first surfaced as a serious issue in Britain or, more
specifically, in Scotland, during that decade, largely due to the efforts of a peripatetic
veterinary surgeon, Richard Rutherford. After a career that saw him practise (and trade
in livestock) variously in the United States, India and Australia,58 Rutherford returned to
Scotland to introduce what he claimed to be a new and improved mode oftail inoculation
learnt in Australia.59 His method, which essentially meant drawing a seton, contaminated
with serous fluid, through the tail, was new to Britain, if not the rest of Europe (it was
essentially what Willems described as "le methode hollandaise", in a tribute to Dutch
innovation60). Nevertheless, Rutherford soon won support from leading Scottish veterinar-
ians, dairymen and cattle fatteners. His supporters were able to exert sufficient political
54Idem, 'Professor Gamgee and the farmers', Vet. appointed to inquire into pleuro-pneumonia, 1888,
Hist., 1979-80, N.S., 1: 47-63, 57-60; and an editorial op. cit., note 47 above, Qs. 6476-8, 6603-7 and
in the Veterinarian, Sept. 1876, 4th series, 23: 620-6. 8461-4.
55See Iain Pattison, A great British veterinarian 58JRFisher, 'FootandmouthdiseaseinAustralia',
forgotten: James Beart Simonds 1810-1904, London, Aust. Veter. J., May 1984, 61: 158-61, p. 160; J F
J A Allen, 1990; Ministry ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Smithcors, TheAmerican veterinaryprofession, Ames,
Food(MAFF),Animalhealth:acentenary, 1865-1965, Iowa State University Press, 1963, p. 195.
London, HMSO, 1965, pp. 35, 43. 59R Rutherford, 'Inoculation as a prevention of
56Fisher, op. cit., note 53 above, pp. 285-6; Perren, pleuro-pneumonia', Trans. HighlandAgric. Soc.
op. cit., note 49 above, pp. 123-32. Scotland, 1882, 4th series, 14: 14-31.
57See,forexample, WMcCall, 'The suppressionof 60Louis Willems, Cinquante anndes d'inoculation
contagious pleuro-pneumonia: inoculation and pre'ventive de la pe'ripneumonie contagieuse des
stamping-out', Veterinarian, Feb. 1887, 60: bovides (1850-1900), Hayez, Imprimeur de
201-10, and Report ofthe Departmental Committee l'Academie Royal de Belgique, Bruxelles, 1900, p.45.
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pressure to win aDepartmental Committee onthequestion, atwhich Rutherford was given
an extensive hearing.
This was nottohis advantage. Although, asWorboys notes, inoculation couldhavebeen
presented as a "scientific" alternative to slaughter,6' Rutherford was not interested in this
and was happily ignorant of any immunological principles involved. His emphasis was
solely on the relative cost-effectiveness of inoculation as a potential basis for eradicating
CBPP. Brown, who had inherited his mentor's antipathy to inoculation,62 turnedthis to his
ownadvantage. Otherwitnesses dwelledonthe shortcomings ofinoculation, notably thatit
did not "take" on animals that already had the disease, masking the survival ofCBPP and
thusexacerbating thecriticalproblemofsymptomless carriers. Aswasalsoemphasized, the
efficacy ofinoculation remained variable and there was still uncertainty as to the length of
protection given. Under intensive questioning, Rutherford was reduced to unsupported
assertions of the complete efficacy and reliability of his method and of his own ability
to recognize animals already incubating CBPP.63 The Committee's report could hardly do
otherwise than come down wholeheartedly in favour of stamping-out.64
Brown thus won the debate, eventually gaining the financial support and powers neces-
sary for a rigorous slaughter programme in 1890. The eradication of CBPP was finally
achieved in 1898, taking rather longer than promised. One reason for this was continuing
problems in gaining compliance from owners and traders, despite compensation payments
that were generous in comparison to the plague years of the 1860s.65 The end of the
campaign was also thirteen years later than the final success of the Dutch eradication
programme, frequently adverted to by the British Veterinary Department as a model of
what a slaughter programme could achieve.
The Netherlands
TheBritishVeterinary Department's close interest in the Dutchcampaign oferadication
included a special survey inits annual report in 1885,66 whenitwasevidenttheDutch were
close to success. Here, and in evidence to the 1888 Committee, the emphasis was on the
critical importance ofslaughter. That tail inoculation was also employed was mentioned,
only to be dismissed, using selective statistics (the Department's table in its report did not
showthenumbersofcattleinoculated) asaretrograde step.Further, leadingquestionstothe
onlyDutchwitnesstothe 1888Committee,JFLameris,oneoftheninedistrictveterinarians
ofthe Netherlands, responsible for the Province ofSouth Holland including the Spoeling-
district, led him to assert the critical importance of slaughter over inoculation in the
successful programme.
61 Worboys, '"Killing and curing"', see note 51 pleuro-pneumonia, 1888, see note 47 above, Qs.
above, p. 60; Rutherford's evidence in Report ofthe 976-80, 1114-24.
Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into 64ReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeappointed
pleuro-pneumonia, 1888, see note 47 above, Qs. 918, to inquire intopleuro-pneumonia, 1888, see note 47
928-32, 1070-2. above, pp. xi-xv.
62See Brown's comments in response to a paper 65MAFF, op. cit., note 55 above, pp. 56-63,
on 'Inoculation as a preventive against pleuro- 158-62.
pneumonia, &c.', in the Veterinarian, 1887, 60: 66Annual report ofthe Veterinary Department of
682-3. the Privy Council Officefor 1885, London, HMSO,
63Rutherford's evidence in Report ofthe 1886, pp. 41-4.
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Thepictureconveyedwasmisleading. Slaughterwas anecessary componentoftheDutch
programme but it was complemented by the use ofinoculation through the most important
phases of the campaign. This was not due to a consciously thought-out strategy. Rather,
policy shifted and changed over time according to the balance ofcontending interests and
other circumstances.
The Netherlands had suffered as badly as Britain from the rinderpest epizootic of 1865
and 1866, until it too resorted to stamping out. Thereafter, a permanent state Veterinary
Service was established under the Cattle Act of 1870, albeit with only five district veter-
inarians who answered to regional authorities as much as to the state Service.67 CBPP was
theobviousearlypriority; quite apartfromits local incidence, mostofthe live cattle trade to
Britain from northern Europe passed through Dutch ports like Rotterdam andFlushing, and
was under threat from the growth of British restrictions against imported disease.
The first response ofthe new Service was to issue an Order requiring the slaughter ofall
herds containing cattle diseased with CBPP. This proved unenforceable, quite apart from
the expense of an adequate level of compensation (although the expense was reduced by
some 25 per centby selling the meat and skins from slaughtered carcasses). In response to
the protests of stockowners and traders, and after considerable political debate, an official
inquiry was instituted, leading to an Act passed in 1874 that required the slaughter of
diseased stock and the inoculation ofcontacts. Professional veterinarians, paid one guilder
per inoculation, were made responsible for their own districts.68
The modified campaign was a success. Less than 1 per cent ofinoculated stock subse-
quentlytookthedisease,compliancewashighandcostsgreatlyreduced. Astheincidenceof
CBPP declined markedly, it allowed various provinces to contemplate complete eradica-
tion. Thefirst to act was Frieslandwherecompulsory inoculationforcontacts wasreplaced
by compulsory herd slaughter in 1877. Success led to otherprovinces following suit to the
point where the state Service attempted to reinstitute compulsory herd slaughternationally
in 1878.69 Again, this proved premature in the face ofpoor compliance as, for budgetary
reasons, compensation was set atonly halfan animal's carcass value. Nevertheless, by this
time, the core of the continuing problem was easily identifiable as lying in the Spoeling-
district near Rotterdam with its traditionally high turnover of cattle. Inoculation was re-
introducedhereand,by 1884,hadsufficientlyreducedthenumbersofdiseasedcattletothe
point where slaughter could be applied to achieve complete eradication.70
It was an irony ofthe Dutch success, considerable as this was, that afurthercontributory
factor lay in the progressive removal of one ofthe incentives to undertake an eradication
programme. ThelivecattleexporttradetoBritaindeclinedrapidlyinthelate 1870s,dueless
to British restrictions than to rising demand and thus meat prices in Germany and France,
according toRichardPerren.7' Thisreducedgreatlythepotentialforinfectionfromcattlein
67Offringa, op. cit., note 24 above, pp. 169-70. 70M Bettel, 'The eradication ofpleuro-pneumonia
68Verslag aan den Koning van de bevindingen fromHolland',J. Comp.Pathol. Therap., 1889,2:315-
en handelingen van het Veeartsenijkundig 8; VerslagaandenKoning,op.cit, 1884,note68above,
Staatstoezicht, The Hague, Van Weelden en p. 24;evidenceofJohnMaytotheSelectCommitteeon
Mingelen, 1874, pp. 24-7. theCattlePlague, 1877, note28 above, Qs. 1874-2124;
69Offringa, op.cit., note24above,pp. 170; Versiag evidence ofJ FLameris in Reportofthe Departmental
aan den Koning, 1879, op. cit., note 68 above, p. 54; Committee appointed to inquire into pleuro-pneumo-
JJWester, Geschiedenisderveeartsenijkunde,Utrecht, nia, 1888, see note 47 above, Qs. 7061-212.
Hoonte, 1939, pp. 335-40. 71Perren, op. cit., note 49 above, p. 121.
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transitacrosstheNetherlands, andpermittedtheadoptionoftradebanssimilartotheBritish.
The lasttwo orthree cases ofCBPPwere in stockintroducedfrom Belgium, withvery few
cattle exported orre-exported toBritainby themid-i880s. The pointalso serves toempha-
size the great advantage the British had in seeking to stamp out CBPP.
As the only majorimporteroflivestock, Britain was in aposition unilaterally to insiston
thetermsunderwhichtheyweregivenentry. Asanisland,itwasabletopolicesuchentryin
a more cost-effective fashion than any otherEuropean country. The Swiss experience also
serves todemonstratethepoint. Asearly asthe 1850s, the Swisshadputinplaceastamping
out programme that was effective and relatively cheap. Compensation was low but cattle
ownerswereallowedtosellthehidesandeventhemeatofslaughteredstock,thesenotbeing
considered infectious or adanger to humanhealth.72 However, each time that Switzerland
was close to claiming completely CBPP free status, introduced stock caused further epi-
zootics that then had to be dealt with.73 Full eradication was claimed only in 1895,74 by
whichtime its majorneighbourshadachievedthis status orwere close to it. Countries with
even morepermeable borders thus facedgreaterproblems and costs in seeking toeradicate
the disease.
France
It was seemingly inevitable that the French would adopt tail inoculation as the core of
theircontrol strategies against CBPP. RonaldHubscherhas arguedthatPasteurian innova-
tion was akey factorinraising the social andprofessional status ofFrenchveterinarians,75
but Willems' innovation played a preparatory if subordinate role. Quite apart from its
widespread adoption by veterinary practitioners, Willems' innovation fitted perfectly
into the French veterinary research programme that became subsumed under the name
ofPasteur. By the mid-nineteenth century, training atthe veterinary colleges ofLyons and
Alfort had been transformed and staff members such as J-B Auguste Chaveau and Henri
Bouley accepted as serious scientists. Theresearch they pursued on "vaccinia" ininocula-
tion underpinned and made possible Pasteur's triumphs with vaccination.76 Not surpris-
ingly, they werekeenly interested inWillems' innovation. Bouley was appointedtotestthe
technique in 1854, reporting that 96 per cent ofinoculated cattle gainedimmunity. He and
ChauveauledinpromotingtheuseoftailinoculationinFranceandwereinstrumental inthe
award of leprix Barbier to Willems in 1882 from the Academie de Medecine ofParis.77
Pasteurhimselfwaswell awareofandadmiredWillems' innovation. Heoriginallychose
CBPP as theprime focus forhis research on vaccination, andonly his failure to isolate the
causative agent led him to turn from CBPP to anthrax. He encouraged his nephew, Adrien
Loir, to experiment with improving the technique oftail inoculation when the latter was in
72Alois Tschopp, 'DieTierseuchenbekampfung 75R Hubscher, LesMaFtres des bites: les ve'teri-
in den Kantonen Luzem, Schwyg and Zug von naires dans la societefrangaise (XVIIIe-XXe siecle),
1798 bis 1900', thesis, Zurich University, 1985, Paris, Editions Odile Jacob, 1999, pp. 85-7.
pp. 63-5; Gamgee, op. cit., note 50 above, 76Wilkinson, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 147-61;
pp. 492-4. Hubscher, op. cit., note 75 above, pp. 182-6.
73Veterinarian, 1876,49: 158,225and476;Annual 77Huygelen, op. cit., note 39 above, pp. 266, 269-
report ofthe Veterinary Department ofthe Privy 71;Willems,op.cit., note60above,pp. 17, 38-40,47-
Council Officefor 1878, London, HMSO, 1879, 8. Hubscher, op. cit., note 75 above, pp. 92-5; see also
pp. 48-9. L-GNeumann,Biographiesveterinaires,Paris,Asselin
74Tschopp, op. cit., note 72 above, p. 95. et Houzeau, 1896, pp. 34-6.
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Australia on behalfofthe Pasteur Institute.78 Willems reciprocated with keen support for
Pasteurian theory and innovation. Like Pasteur, Willems conducted atrial ofhis technique
atPouilly-le-Fort(underthesupervisionofPasteur, BouleyandChauveau); likePasteur, he
was triumphantly vindicated (and, like Pasteur, possibly lucky to achieve 100 per cent
success79).
Atthe sametime, leading veterinarians remainedconvincedofthemeritsofslaughter; it
was Bouley and Chauveau who had organized the successful programme that contained
rinderpestwith minimallosses(apartfromtheanimalsintheParisZoo)inthe 1860s. Sotoo
didPasteur, who evenqueried the relevance ofhisrabies vaccine to the British, whenthey
hadthe means to stamp outthedisease as aprelude to itsexclusion.80 In the 1870s, British
restrictions ledto anabruptdecline incattle exports toBritainandfirstledtheAgricultural
Ministry to contemplate concerted action against CBPP. It was made clearfrom the outset
that while slaughter was the most attractive option, given the scale ofthe problem, espe-
ciallyintheParisdairies, costwasthecriticalfactorthatmilitatedagainstitsemployment.81
Inoculation was relatively cheap and acceptable to stockowners although, at first, whether
or not it was made compulsory was left to the discretion of local authorities.82
As late as 1883, whenitwasevidentthatthis strategy washavinglittleimpact, there was
still a reluctance to go further. Bouley, despite favouring compulsory inoculation, still
accepted the need for some local discretion, "in orderthat the measures should not appear
vexatious,but,aboveall,thattheyshouldnotexposethepublicTreasurytograveandheavy
charges."83 Later in the decade, two adaptations were made. First, Pasteur was given the
role of developing a more reliable mode of inoculation, which he did by adopting the
technique developed by Loir at his suggestion. This consisted of conducting successive
passages of the "virus" (as it was now termed) through calves, and was designed less to
attenuate its virulence than to reduce the risk ofcontamination (notentirely successfully).
Second, andmoreimportantly, inoculation wasnowcomplementedbyslaughter,following
the Dutch model, where CBPP incidence had been reduced to manageable proportions.
By the end ofthe century, it was evident that success was close at hand, the final cases
occurring in 1905.84 Belgium and Italy had already achieved eradication, employing
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variations on the combination of inoculation and slaughter that had become the accepted
model. This left only one major western European country still facing serious problems in
achieving eradication.
Germany
France had two advantages in controlling CBPP by the time a serious programme was
established. First, aselsewhere,thedeclineofurbandairiesundercompetitionfromcountry
milkreduced anotorious centre ofinfection. Secondly, its frontiers were with states where
CBPPwaseithernotpresentorfastbeingbroughtundercontrol. Spainhadalwaysbeenfree
(although the disease was introduced at the end ofthe century). Belgium, Switzerland and
Italy were free ornearly soby the mid-l890s. As forGermany, although CBPPremained a
problemwell intothenextcentury, thewesternregions sawonlyminorsporadic incursions
even in the late 1880s. It was in the eastern regions of Germany that CBPP remain-
ed enzootic, and this was in part a result of the continuing problem of incursions from
further east.
The Prussian authorities hadlongbeen accustomed to having to meetperiodic invasions
ofrinderpest fromtheEast, andthis alsobecame trueofCBPP. Before the formation ofthe
Germanempire, policiestowardsCBPPvariedamongthe states, andthisremainedthe case
after 1871, although rinderpestbecame an imperial responsibility.85 Itremained aproblem
as late as the 1880s, the prime concern above all others. From the early 1870s, the old
militarycordonwasgraduallymodifiedandgreateremphasisplacedonveterinaryexpertise
andtrade interdicts (with aviewtoreducing theprice premium thatmade cattle smuggling
so attractive). However, the states retained separate veterinary departments and policy
towards CBPP continued to vary widely.
CBPP had been enzootic in Schleswig and Holstein when these provinces were under
Danishrule (anddespite Denmark's disease-free status). AspartoftheGermanempire, the
importance of dairying and cattle exports led them, despite the cost, to institute a herd
slaughter programme. This was successful and stringent border controls thereafter kept
theseprovinceslargelyfreeofCBPP.86Elsewhere,however, suchmeasurescouldhardlybe
contemplatedinthefaceofthepotential costs. InPrussia, after 1875,diseasedanimalswere
supposed to be slaughtered, but compensation (met by a tax on farmers) and thus com-
pliance wereoftenpoor. Theemphasis, internally and ontheborders, was on athree-month
quarantine forintroduced orcontact stock and, quite apart fromcompliance problems, this
could be inadequate in the face of symptomless carriers.87 Karl Muller, professor at the
Berlin Veterinary College, praised the British slaughterprogramme in 1888, andlamented
that "we shouldhave gonethe same wayinPrussiaifwecouldpaytheenormous costs such
a stamping-out system would require".88
Even so, CBPP declined in incidence in Prussia over the next decade, in part due to a
decline in urban dairies and more effective border controls with the Russian and Austrian
empires. The great exception was the traditional trouble spotofMagdeburg in Saxony (but
85Von denDriesch, op. cit, note 38 above, p. 184. 87Ibid., Qs. 1341-8, 1433-8, 1492-8, 1511-16.
86Muller's evidence to the Select Committee on 88Report ofthe Departmental Committee
the Cattle Plague, 1877, see note 28 above, Qs. appointed to inquire intopleuro-pneumonia, 1888, see
1421-5. note 47 above, p. 294, Appendix 7.
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part of Prussia after 1866). Muller and his colleague, Andreas Christian Gerlach, at the
Berlin Veterinary College, contemplated more stringent controls but faced determined
opposition from regional producers and politicians who had long favoured inoculation.89
The debate over slaughter or inoculation flared again, and again cost proved the deciding
consideration. In 1888, the Magdeburg pastoral association, alarmed by the prospect of a
full slaughter programme, induced the Prussian Minister of Agriculture to establish an
official trial of inoculation. This was carried out by the noted veterinary pathologist,
Wilhelm Schutz, who had a reputation for sensitivity to political considerations.90 He
pronounced inoculation an emphatic success,9' and it became official policy in Saxony
to the end of the century and beyond.
Thiswaspresumably afactorinthefailureofGermanytoeradicateCBPPbeforetheFirst
World War. However, as always, its eastern regions faced much greater problems than
other parts ofWestern Europe. CBPP remained enzootic in the Polish part ofthe Russian
Empire92 and, given the continuing price differentials between east and west, Germany
was always vulnerable to repeated re-introductions. Further, sugarbeetproduction, unlike
urbandairying, wasagrowthindustry, amajorcontributortotheGermaneconomy. Inthese
circumstances, inoculation was acost-effective alternative to afull eradication programme
based on slaughter.
Conclusion
In 1898, Edmond Nocard and Pierre Roux identified the causal organism ofCBPP.93 In
the same year, in his veterinary textbook, Nocard also stated that "the question oftreating
pleuropneumonia is of limited value, since the animal disease laws of every country
stipulate the slaughter of sick cattle".94 It was a statement with which veterinarians in
state services could all agree; the British Veterinary Department was far from alone in its
predilection for slaughter.
The eradication ofCBPP in most countries ofWestern Europe in the late nineteenth or
early twentieth centuries was a considerable achievement. While slaughter had worked
admirably against rinderpest, and was thepreferred centrepiece ofstrategies against infec-
tious diseases, a combination of different aetiological characteristics and economic con-
siderationsmadeitlessappropriateinthecaseofCBPP.Thealternativetoslaughterwastail
inoculation as developed by Louis Willems, an innovation which derived from a long
tradition of empirical experimentation. It anticipated the work of Pasteur, under which
"scientific research could pay offso handsomely in practical results",95 but its popularity
89Rudolf Disselhorst, Die Tierseuchen, soweit sie Queensland, Government Printer, 1895, vol. 1,
unter das deutsche Reichsviehseuchengesetz von 18. pp. 1-23.
Mai 1909fallen: in 21 Vorlesungen, Berlin, P Parey, 92J Janiszewski, '40-ta rocznica stlumienia zarazy
1909, pp. 87-8; Gamgee, 'Official report, 1863', note plucnej bydla w Polsce', Medycyna Weterynaryjna,
50 above, pp. 491-2. 1975, 31: 307-8.
90L Z Saunders, A biographical history ofveter- 93E Nocard and P P E Roux, 'Le microbe de la
inarypathology, Laurence, Kansas, Allen Press, 1996, peripneumonie', Annales de l'Institut Pasteur, 1898,
pp. 203-4. 12: 240-62.
91W Schutz, 'Pleuro-pneumonia and itsprevention 94Cited in Blancou, op. cit., note 19 above,
by inoculation', transl. P A Kob, in Votes and p. 1280.
Proceedings ofthe Legislative Assembly, Brisbane, 95Dubos, op. cit., note 78 above, p. 10.
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with stockowners was due to its cost-effectiveness. It minimized both the direct costs ofa
control programme and the indirect costs from disruption to trade and commercial opera-
tions generally.
Stockowners proved apowerful force in modifying thepreference ofstate veterinarians
foraslaughterprogramme. InBritain,theyachievedtheirprimeobjectiveofimportcontrols
before aslaughterprogramme was seriously mounted. By the time thishappened, the costs
ofslaughterforthe main groupofstockowners, inrural areas, wererelatively low andthey
were generally willing to give their support. Outside Britain, stockowners provedeffective
in lobbying theirpolitical representatives in favour oftail inoculation, and this was attrac-
tivetothelatterforthesamereasons-itsrelativecheapnessincomparisontoslaughter.The
resultingpolicy mixprovedefficient as well as cost-effective, especially andearliestinthe
Netherlands, notleastbecauseitmadeforbettercompliance. Infact,ifthereisalessonfrom
the Western European achievement it would be that, while slaughtering sick and contact
animals makes sense against infectious diseases, such a strategy should be adapted to
circumstances and implemented with an eye to the size of the costs involved and on
who bears these costs.
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